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Abstract
We designed a new task, called nonmatch-to-goal, to study the ability of macaque monkeys to interact with humans in a
rule-guided paradigm. In this task the monkeys were required to choose one of two targets, from a list of three. For each
choice, they were required to switch from their choice on the previous trial to a different one. In a subset of trials the
monkeys observed a human partner performing the task. When the human concluded his turn, the monkeys were required
to switch to a new goal discarding the human’s previous goal. We found that monkeys were very skillful in monitoring
goals, not only of their own choice by also those of their human partner. They showed also a surprising ability to coordinate
their actions, taking turns with the human partner, starting and stopping their own turn following the decision of the
human partner in the task.
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Introduction
Very few studies have examined the ability of monkeys to
interact with conspecifics or humans in a controlled situation. One
influential line of research has shown that while observing human
actions, monkeys display a shared neural representation of the
action performed [1–3]. However, it is still debated whether these
representations demonstrate that monkeys can fully understand
human or conspecific actions [4]. Others studies have examined
the ability of monkeys to interact by coordinating [5,6] or
cooperating [7] with each other, and their sensitivity to the reward
received by other monkeys [8]. In chimpanzees, Hiraka and Fuwa
[9] showed not only cooperative behavior, but also the ability to
select the most efficient partner. Very little work has been done to
investigate the ability of monkeys to monitor others’ goals in a
controlled experimental set up [6].
We wanted to test whether monkeys were able to use the active
monitoring of human goals to make their own future choices. In a
test of observational learning, Meunier et al. [10] showed that
monkeys succeeded in learning by observing a monkey model
solving discrimination learning problems, but failed with a human
model. Therefore, it remains controversial whether monkeys can
have the kinds of interaction with humans that they have with
conspecifics.
We wanted to test whether monkeys interact successfully with
humans in a more controlled experimental setting. We measured
the ability of monkeys to guide their choices based on a human’s
previous choices. In line with our previous studies [11–14], we
designed a nonmatch-to-goal task (NMTG) that required monkeys
to switch either from their immediate previous goal or from the
human partner’ s goal to a new goal, in order to receive a reward.
We found that macaques were able to alternate roles with a
human partner. They stopped their turns when the human
intervened and promptly restarted when the human partner
moved the arm away from the testing apparatus. The monkeys did
not need any cue signal to instruct them that it was their turn.
Instead, the monkeys monitored and adapted to the intervention
of the human partner, stopping and restarting their turn
accordingly. The monkeys showed high levels of performance in
switching to a new goal after the human partner’s choice, which
was comparable to that observed for switching their own goals.
This study extends to human–monkey (H–M) pairs the opportu-
nity to investigate social cognition in a controlled laboratory setup,
opening a door to future behavioral, neuropsychological, and
neurophysiological studies adopting similar paradigms.
Materials and Methods
Animals
Animal care, housing, and experimental procedures were in
conformity with the European (Directive 86/609/ECC) and
Italian (D.L. 116/92) laws on the use of nonhuman primates in
scientific research. The research protocol was approved by the
Italian Health Ministry (Central Direction for the Veterinary
Service, approval n. 199/2009-B). The housing conditions and the
experimental procedures were in accordance with the European
law on humane care and use of laboratory animals and complied
with the recommendations of the Weatherall report (The use of
non-human primates in research).
Both monkeys were monitored daily by the researchers and the
animal care staff, and every second day from the veterinarian, to
check the conditions of health and welfare.
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the home cage environment toys (often containing items of food
that they liked) to promote their exploratory behaviour. At the end
of each experimental session, the researcher that tested the animals
spent half an hour interacting with the monkeys directly, giving for
example new objects to manipulate. We think that this interaction
with humans, in addition to the interaction that was part of the
task performed, can help to reduce potential stress related to the
experiment. Recently, to increase the level of enrichment in the
animal facility room, we have also showed movies in a monitor
and we are currently starting to evaluate the benefits.
Surgical techniques
In monkey 1 the experiments were carried out while the
monkey’ s head was fixed. For this purpose, a head-holder was
implanted. The animal was preanesthetized with ketamine
(10 mg/kg, i.m.) and anesthetized with isofluoran (Abbott
Laboratories) through a constant flux of isofluoran/air mixture
(1–3%, to effect). Antibiotics and analgesics were administered
postoperatively.
Behavioral testing
The monkeys sat in a primate chair, monkey 1 with the head
fixed and monkey 2 with the head free, facing a video touch screen
(Microtouch, 19 inches, 8006600 pixel resolution) 40 cm away.
For both monkeys, the human partner was standing upright, close
to the animal, on the monkey’s right side. For this experiment, the
human partner was always the same researcher with whom the
monkeys were accustomed.
Figure 1A shows the sequence of events in the NMTG task. The
trial began when a white circle, the central stimulus, appeared at
the center of the video screen (Fig. 1A).
The monkeys had to touch the circle within 1 s, otherwise the
trial was aborted and a new trial started. After the monkeys
touched the central stimulus, a horizontal grey bar appeared. The
monkeys were required to continue touching the central stimulus
for 0.9–1.6 s. Next, two targets (called object goals) appeared, one
to the right and one to the left of the central stimulus, after which
the monkeys maintained their right hand on the central stimulus
for a delay period of 0.4–1 s. The disappearance of the horizontal
bar served as a go signal. The monkeys then made a reaching
movement to one of the two goals, within a 3.5 s limit, and
maintained the hand on the chosen goal for a hold time of 0.8–
1.3 s. For correctly performed trials, three drops of fluid reward
were delivered. After both correct and error trials, the two goals
and the central stimulus disappeared and a 0.1 s intertrial interval
with a black screen began. We randomized all the durations of the
epochs in 50 ms steps. The human partner could decide to begin a
‘human trial sequence’ (1, 2, 3, or 4 trials in a row) at any time
during the session. The sequence of events for these trials was
identical to that of trials performed by the animals; however,
reward was delivered to the monkey in all cases.
After we concluded the first experiment, to test whether the
monkeys’ ability to follow the human partner’s trials was strictly
dependent on the reward delivery, we studied the monkeys’
performance in a second experiment. We introduced a visual
feedback at the end of each NMTG trial, to indicate correct and
error responses. Two visual stimuli, an empty square or a circle
around the chosen target, were used for correct and error trials,
respectively. We presented the feedback 0.5 s after the monkeys/
subject touched the target for 0.8–1.3 s, followed by the reward in
the case of correct trials. All the other events were the same as in
the standard NMTG task. We omitted reward in a subset of
correctly (one out of six) performed human trials and measured
monkeys’ performance in these unrewarded interactive trials.
Trial types
Monkeys performed two classes of trials, classified based on who
performed the trial immediately before the current trial. If the
monkey performed the previous trial it was called a ‘noninteractive
trial’, whereas if the human partner performed the previous trial it
was called an ‘interactive trial’. Between two interactive trials, the
monkeys performed a variable number of trials, typically three or
more.
For the first trial of a session, any chosen goal was accepted as
correct and rewarded. This goal was then designated as the
previous goal and this designation was used for the following trial.
On each trial, the previous goal was presented on the screen
together with another goal. In order to receive a reward, the
monkeys had to reject the previous goal and choose the alternative
(future goal). Figure 1B shows the 262 combinations of goals and
positions for the current trial when the previous goal was a purple
polygon. Goal positions were always assigned pseudorandomly
unless the trial followed a mistake. Two types of trials were
pseudorandomly interspersed, and they differed in terms of
whether the correct goal on the current trial had appeared on
the previous trial. When it had, we called this trial type a ‘familiar-
goal’ trial, but when the correct future goal had not appeared on
the previous trials, we called it an ‘unfamiliar-goal’ trial. The
familiarity is defined only with respect to the previous goal; overall,
familiar and unfamiliar future goals were presented with equal
probability.
If the monkeys made a mistake, by erroneously choosing the
previous goal, they did not receive a reward and a correction trial
followed. Correction trials consisted of a repetition of the same two
goals in the same positions. The correction trial required the
monkeys to choose the goal that should have been chosen during
the previous trial.
In the interactive trials the monkeys interacted with a human
partner. When the human partner moved his arm toward the
screen, the monkeys drew back their arm letting the human
partner perform the trial. The human partner decided the number
of trials to perform: one, two, three or four (Figure 1C). When the
human partner drew back his arm at the end of a trial, the
monkeys again approached the central stimulus, and in this way
began their next trial. In the interactive trials the monkeys had to
monitor the human partner’s choice, and later reject human’s
previous goal choice in favor of the alternative goal, neglecting
their own previous choice.
Data collection
A noncommercial software package, CORTEX (www.cortex.
salk.edu), was used to control stimuli presentation and reward
delivery and to record touches on the screen. A video camera
recorded who performed each trial, the monkey or the human
partner. An experimenter classified each trial offline, using the
video recordings.
Results
We studied the performance of Monkey 1 in 9 sessions and of
Monkey 2 in 5 sessions. Each session was run on different days.
We examined the performance of both monkeys in the two
conditions: interactive and noninteractive. We found that both monkeys
performed the task at a high level of performance in both
conditions.
Figure 2 shows the results for the interactive and noninteractive trials.
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trials were, 94% (136/145) and 95% (379/401), for monkey 1 and
79% (142/179) and 87% (321/368) for monkey 2, respectively,
which wasabovechancelevelforbothmonkeysand bothconditions
(binomial test, p,0.0001). These results suggest that monkeys can
recall the most recent goal chosen by their human partner, and
apply this knowledge to make their own decisions in the interactive
trials. However, the results from the interactive trials may also be due
Figure 1. Experimental design. A. Sequence of task events in a trial. Each black rectangle represents the video screen. The white circle illustrates
the central stimulus, the grey horizontal bar is the go cue. The green cross and the purple polygon are the two potential response goals. In this
example trial, that could represent the first trial of a session, the response decision (highlighted by the braked rectangle) is toward the purple
polygon. We used three potential goals in a session: a purple polygon, a green cross and a blue circle B. In this example sequence of trials, the
previous goal was the purple polygon (left yellow box, as in the trial in A). The same goal was, by task design, presented again in the current trial
(right green box), together with another potential future goal, which was either: 1) the familiar goal that was the goal discarded in the previous trial
(green cross); or 2) the unfamiliar goal that was not presented in the previous trial (blue circle). C. Example sequence of trials with the human partner
interacting with the monkey. Numbers indicate the trial position after the trial in A. Each panel represents the response choice. The correct goal
(response) was always the goal that differed from the previous goal acquired either by the human agent in the interactive condition or by the monkey
in the noninteractive condition. In the human trials the monkeys were required only to monitor the human partner choices. Notice that in this
example sequence monkeys in trial number 5 could not choose the purple polygon based on what was their own previous choice (the purple
polygon in trial 2), they had instead to choose a goal based on what the human partner chose in trial 4, that was the blue circle.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032209.g001
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applying one of the following rules: (1) choose own previous goal, (2)
choose opposite of own previous goal. Each of these rules increases
the probability of choosing the correct goal to above chance.
However, the first rule works only if an odd number of trials are
performed by the human partner, while the second works only after
an even number of trials performed by the human partner. To
reduce the possibility that the monkeys learned one of these rules,
the human partner varied his number (from 1 to 4) of trials.
To quantitatively assess whether the monkeys tended to follow
one of the rules previously described, we divided the errors based
on the number of trials performed by the human agent before an
interactive trial. We found that both monkeys had a comparable
performance in this regard. Monkey 1 performed at 92% (61/66),
93% (42/45), 93% (13/14) and 100% (20/20), respectively after
sequences of 1, 2, 3, and 4 trials of the human partner, with no
significant difference (p.0.05, Chi Square test). Similarly, monkey
2 performed at 77% (53/69), 81% (44/54), 83%, (29/35), and
76% (16/21), respectively, with no significant difference between
sequences (p.0.05, Chi Square test).
A similar success rate for 1 and 3 intervening human trials
versus 2 and 4 of such trials shows that monkeys based their choice
on what their partner did rather than the previous choices that the
monkeys had made. The results for 3 and 4 intervening trials
performed by the human partner show that monkeys were able to
maintain a prolonged attention on the behavior of the human
partner. Using the video recordings, we also examined the ability
of monkeys to take turns and coordinate with the human agent.
We found that both monkeys initiated trials immediately after
seeing the human agent withdraw the hand from the screen, with a
success of 100% in both monkeys.
We studied the performance of the two monkeys in the NMTG
tasks with visual feedbacks to test whether they could perform
interactive trials without reward delivery after correctly performed
human trials (four sessions with monkey 1 and three sessions with
monkey 2). We found that the average correct performance in the
interactive trials that followed a correct but not rewarded trial were
respectively, 88% (71/81) for monkey 1, and 86% (95/111) for
monkey 2, and this was above chance level for both monkeys
(binomial test, p,0.0001).
Discussion
We tested two monkeys in a NMTG task, which required
monkeys to interact with a human agent. Both monkeys showed
an excellent performance with a very high success rate in both the
noninteractive condition, after a self-acquired goal, and in the
interactive condition, after the human partner-acquired goal. The
second experiment showed that monkeys retained a high success
rate of interactive trials when the reward delivery was replaced by
visual feedback in human trials.
We emphasize that our study is not one of social cooperation or
social learning. Nevertheless, it has several implications for future
neurophysiological and behavioral studies directed to studying the
cognitive processes underlying such functions. To date, only a
handful of studies have shown that monkeys can learn from other
monkeys [10,15–18] as humans do so readily [19]. Other studies
have shown that monkeys can learn the ordinal position of pictures
watching other monkeys [16,18] and monitoring their behavior [6].
It is clear that we are only beginning to understand the
potentials of using monkeys as a model for studying the cognitive
and affective processes underlying social behavior at the neural
level [5,6]. In this regard, it is important to mention the pioneering
study of Yoshida et al. [6]. They have shown that medial
prefrontal neurons are able to distinguish self from others by
discharging specifically for another agent’s actions, but only in a
social contest. Here we extend this line of investigation, showing
that monkeys can monitor the behavior of their human partner for
multiple trials, alternating the role of actor and observer with a
human agent.
We emphasize that, although several previous studies have
shown monkeys responding to one another’s behavior, there were
strong doubts as to whether they could do so when interacting with
humans. Questions about the ability of monkeys to interact socially
with humans occurred even in behaviors much simpler than the
current one, such as following the gaze of others. While it has been
shown that monkeys are able to follow the gaze of a conspecific
[20,21], there has been more controversy on the ability of monkey
to use the communicative gestures of humans, with some studies
failing to find signs of this ability [22,23] while others showing
some evidence of this ability in macaques [24,25]. Social learning
in the form of imitating tool use by human agents has also
generated controversy, with some studies finding some evidence in
support of such imitation [26,27] and others failing to find such
evidence [28,29], depending on the experimental design. When
we go beyond gaze following or learning about tool use, to
consider the ability of monkeys to monitor or learn more complex
behaviors, previous studies have casted serious doubts on the
capacity to learn from observing human behavior [17,10].
Meunier and colleagues [10] have shown that monkeys could
learn, to a certain degree, which object was associated to a reward
by observing another monkey, but not a human, performing the
task. That result leads to the possibility that there could be a limit
to the ability of monkeys to interact with individuals of another
species. Here, we showed strong evidence that, at least in the
context of our laboratory task, monkeys can engage in such
interactions and do so extraordinary well.
The differences between those previous results and ours might
be explained by several differences in the experiment design. First,
the imitative nature of the task used by Meunier et al. [10], is
different from ours in that it might have required social
identification. We think, however, that the main difference is the
seminatural settings adopted by Meunier et al. [10], which did not
require monkeys to pay attention to the other monkeys or to the
human agents. In contrast, our laboratory setting posed greater
demands on attention to the performance of the human model.
Moreover, we showed that the human’s goals could be similarly
monitored both by the monkey with the head free and by the
monkey with the head fixed.
Figure 2. Behavioral performance. Bars show percent correct
response of monkey 1 and monkey 2 for interactive (blue bars) and
noninteractive trials (red bars). Numbers 1–4 indicate in the interactive
trials the number of previous trials performed in sequence by the
human partner.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032209.g002
Monkeys Monitor Human Goals
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 February 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e32209We also showed that monkeys were able to wait for their turn
depending on the decisions of the experimenter: a special kind of
turn taking behavior. Turn-taking develops early in human infants
and develops furthermore later [30,31], and it is based at least on
the abilities to distinguish self from others and to monitor others’
goals and their accomplishment.
We believe that our results have relevance beyond behavioral
research. Our results point to the possibility of using H–M
paradigms in other fields of neuroscience. The H–M paradigm can
represent a complementary approach to the monkey–monkey (M–
M) paradigm that has gained prominence recently, offering new
possibilities for controlling the parameters of the interaction. This
could be done, for example, by using the human partner as an
independent variable that can be manipulated in the study in a
way that is much easier than manipulating a monkey partner. For
example, it should be possible to change more flexibly the type of
trials in which the interaction takes place and to predict the
partner’ s success rate by having different agents performing at a
different level of accuracy. Nevertheless, M–M paradigm can be
more adapted to study aspects such as the vicarious reinforcement
[32] or the influence of social hierarchy on social interactions but
new experimental designs should be developed and tested within
the paradigm to investigate these topics.
Our H–M paradigm, especially if adapted to a spatial version,
could be also used to study ‘‘mirror proprieties’’ of neurons [2,33–
35] with the advantage of having behavioral measures, on a trial
by trial basis, to test whether the monkeys paid attention to the
human actions and understood the goal and the outcome
associated to the human agent’s choices. In fact, in our task a
failure in monitoring the actions of the human partner directly
affects success on the next trial. Future studies will need to address
the full range of opportunities that H–M paradigms can offer for
the study of social cognition [36]. For example, we still need to
address whether monkeys are able to learn from the observation of
human agents. This might be done by setting the errors of the
human partner as the independent variable, which would allow us
to investigate learning aspects such as the effects of human partner
errors on learning by observation.
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